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Abstract
We present a new variant of the Va¨xjo¨ interpretation: contextual-
istic statistical realistic. Basic ideas of the Va¨xjo¨ interpretation-2001
are essentially clarified. We also discuss applications to biology, psy-
chology, sociology, economy,...
The first version of the Va¨xjo¨ interpretation of quantum mechanics was
presented in [1], see also [2], after the conference “Quantum Theory: Re-
consideration of foundations”, Va¨xjo¨, June-2001, on the basis of numerous
exciting discussions with participants. I was really surprised, that in spite of
the formal acceptance of the official Copenhagen interpretation, many people
(having top-qualification in quantum physics) still have doubts of various
kinds and many of them are still looking for a realistic interpretation. This
dream about quantum realism was the main stimulus for my attempt to
present a new version of the realistic interpretation of quantum mechanics.
The main problem was to create such an interpretation in which realism
∗Supported in part by the EU Human Potential Programme, contact HPRN–CT–2002–
00279 (Network on Quantum Probability and Applications) and Profile Math. Modelling
in Physics and Cogn. Sc. of Va¨xjo¨ University.
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would coexist with a rather strange (people like to say “nonclassical”) be-
haviour of quantum probabilities – Born’s rule and interference of probabili-
ties.1
In 2000 it was demonstrated [5], see also [6]-[10], that Born’s rule and in-
terference of probabilities can be (quite easily) derived in the realistic frame-
work.2 The only thing that should not be neglected is contextuality of prob-
abilities – dependence of probabilities on complexes of physical conditions
(physical contexts). My investigations were induced by interest to frequency
probability theory, see R. von Mises [20], see also [21]. In the frequency ap-
proach probabilities directly depend on collectives (random sequences) which
are associated with concrete complexes of physical conditions. This proba-
bility theory is contextual from the very beginning.
Since 2001 I organized a series of conferences on foundations of proba-
bility and quantum mechanics 3 and through intensive discussions (and, in
particular, hard critique of some my colleagues, see [25], [26]) my ideas on
interpretations of quantum mechanics are now essentially clearer.
First of all I understood the difference between my contextualism and
1This problem was well known to founders of quantum theory, see, for example, the
correspondence between A. Einstein and E. Schro¨dinger (see [3] for English translation
and comments, see also [4]). E. Schro¨dinger did not like the Copenhagen interpretation;
in particular, he created his cat just to demonstrate absurdness of this interpretation.
Unfortunately, people practically forgot about this, see [4] for detail. We also recall that
Schro¨dinger’s cat was just a modification of Einstein’s example “involving a charge of
gunpowder in a state of unstable chemical equilibrium”, see [4] (letter of Einstein to
Schro¨dinger, 8 August 1935, see [3], p.78). But neither Einstein nor Schro¨dinger could
combine a realistic ensemble model with quantum statistics. In particular, Schro¨dinger
wrote to Einstein that he will accept the realistic statistical interpretation of quantum
mechanics if the interference of probabilities would be explained, see [4]. Consequently
the Copenhagen interpretation preserved its status of the official quantum ideology until
present time.
2And this is one of advantages of my contextual statistical approach, cf. G. Mackey [11],
A. Lande [12], G. Ludwig [13], K. Kraus [14], see also P. Busch, M. Grabowski, P. Lahti
[15], S. Gudder [16], and A. Holevo [17]. In our approach everything is trivial: complex
amplitudes are constructed automatically on the basis of the formula of total probability
with interference term, see [6]-[10]. Moreover, besides the ordinary complex Hilbert space
representation, there exists the hyperbolic one and mixed hyper-trigonometric, see [10]. I
emphasize that the study of former approaches, especially investigations of A. Lande [12]
and G. Mackey [11], were very important for me. However, the starting point were the
books of P. Dirac [18] and R. Feynman [19] in which they payed attention to the mystery
of quantum interference of probabilities.
3See http://www.msi.vxu.se/aktuellt/konferens/index.html and [22]–[24].
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Bohr’s contextualism, see Remark 1.
Then I understood the difference between my contextualism and contex-
tualism of operational (empirisist) interpretation.
Another new issue is understanding of the role of special reference ob-
servables which are used in a concrete model for probabilistic representation
contexts (e.g., in classical and quantum physical models we use the position
and momentum observables).
Finally, it became clear that, in fact, I discussed [1], [2] not an inter-
pretation of quantum mechanics, but a model – statistical and contextual
– of physical reality. The corresponding interpretation of quantum mechan-
ics is obtained automatically for those models in which statistical data can
be represented by complex amplitudes. This is the Va¨xjo¨ interpretation of
quantum mechanics: contextualistic statistical realistic interpretation.
By starting not from the formalism of quantum mechanics (calculus of
probabilities in a complex Hilbert space), but from the general contextual
statistical model of reality, we get the possibility to apply contextual sta-
tistical methods in many domains of science: biology, psychology, sociology,
economy,... In some special cases we can use even the quantum probabilistic
formalism. Such new applications of powerful mathematical methods devel-
oped in quantum theory can induce revolutionary changes in many sciences.
But for us the quantum formalism is not the starting point. We should start
with the general Va¨xjo¨ model of reality (physical, biological, psychological,
social,...) and then test statistical data to find an appropriative mathemati-
cal formalism. In general there are no reasons to hope to obtain the complex
quantum-like representation. For example, there might appear models in
which data cannot be represented by complex amplitudes, but by hyper-
bolic ones. In this case we should use the formalism of hyperbolic quantum
mechanics, [10]. 4
1. Realism of contexts
We start with the basic definition:
Definition 1. A physical context C is a complex of physical conditions.
In principle, the notion of context can be considered as a generalization of
a widely used notion of preparation procedure [15]. I prefer to use contextual-
istic and not preparation terminology. By using the preparation terminology
we presuppose the presence of an experimenter preparing physical systems
4In particular, our approach implies that quantum mechanics is not complete.
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for a measurement. By using the contextualistic terminology we need not
appeal to experimental preparations, experimenter should appear only on
the stage of a measurement. Moreover, context need not be macroscopic. Of
course, there exist experimental contexts – preparation procedures. However,
in general contexts are not coupled to preparation procedures. I consider
contexts as elements of physical reality which exist independently of experi-
menters5 This is the cornerstone of my contextualistic viewpoint to physics
(quantum as well as classical):
Contexts are elements of reality
To construct a concrete model M of reality, we should fix some set of
contexts C, see definition 2.
Remark 1. (Copenhagen and Va¨xjo¨ contextualisms) Bohr’s interpreta-
tion of quantum mechanics is considered as contextualistic, see [28] for detailed
analysis. However, we should sharply distinguish two types of contextualism:
Copenhagen and Va¨xjo¨ contextualisms. For N. Bohr “context” had the mean-
ing “context of a measurement”. For example, in his answer to the EPR challenge
N. Bohr pointed out that position can be determined only in context of position
measurement. For me “context” has the meaning a complex of physical condi-
tions. As was underlined, a context is an element of physical reality and it has no
direct relation to measurements (or existence of experimenters at all).6 For exam-
ple, there exist contextualistic statistical models which cannot be represented in
a complex Hilbert space – so called hyperbolic quantum-like models, [10]. More-
over, a Bohrian measurement context is always macroscopic, our context – a
complex of physical conditions – need not be macroscopic.
2. Observables
5We use the notion “elements of physical reality” in common sense. There is no direct
coupling with the EPR sufficient condition for values of physical observables to be ele-
ments of physical reality, see [27]. Moreover, in general the Va¨xjo¨ model need not contain
physical systems. Thus even the formulation of the question: “Can values of observables
be considered as objective properties of physical systems?” – is in general meaningless.
We shall come to the problem of reality of quantum observables as observables on physical
systems (i.e., classical or EPR reality) in section 11. There we shall present the Va¨xjo¨
model completed by physical systems.
6We remark that so far we do not speak about an interpretation of quantum mechanics.
We are presenting an approach to modeling of physical reality. The quantum represen-
tation is possible only for some class of models,Mquantum. The classMquantum is a very
special subclass of the class of contextualistic statistical models.
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Suppose that there is fixed a set of observables7 O such that any observ-
able a ∈ O can be measured under a complex of physical conditions C for
any C ∈ C.
There can be in principle defined other observables on contexts C which
do not belong to the system O, but they will define another contextual model
of reality, see definition 2.
We remark that our general Va¨xjo¨-representation of reality does not con-
tain physical systems, cf. footnote 5. At the moment we do not (and need
not) consider observables as observables on physical systems. It is only sup-
posed that if a context C is fixed then for any instant of time t we can perform
a measurement of any observable a ∈ O.
We do not assume that all these observables can be measured simulta-
neously; so they need not be compatible. The sets of observables O and
contexts C are coupled through
Axiom 1: For any observable a ∈ O, there are well defined contexts
Cα corresponding to α-filtrations: if we perform a measurement of a under
the complex of physical conditions Cα, then we obtain the value a = α with
probability 1. It is supposed that the set of contexts C contains filtration-
contexts Cα for all observables a ∈ O.
3. Probabilistic representation of contexts
Axiom 2: There are defined contextual probabilities P(a = α/C) for any
context C ∈ C and any observable a ∈ O .
At the moment we do not fix a definition of probability. Depending on a
choice of probability theory we can obtain different models. For any C ∈ C,
there is defined the set of probabilities:
E(O, C) = {P(a = α/C) : a ∈ O}
We complete this probabilistic data by Cα-contextual probabilities:
D(O, C) = {P(a = α/C), ...,P(a = α/Cβ),P(b = β/Cα), ... : a, b, ... ∈ O}
(we remark that D(O, C) does not contain the simultaneous probability dis-
tribution of observables O). Data D(O, C) gives a probabilistic image of
the context C through the system of observables O. Probabilities P(a =
7We shall denote observables by Latin letters, a, b, ..., and their values by Greek letters,
α, β, ...
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α/Cβ), ... play the role of structural constants of a model. We denote by the
symbol D(O, C) the collection of probabilistic data D(O, C) for all contexts
C ∈ C. There is defined the map:
π : C → D(O, C), π(C) = D(O, C). (1)
In general this map is not one-to-one. Thus the π-image of contextualistic
reality is very rough: not all contexts can be distinguished with the aid of
probabilistic data produced by the class of observables O.
Mathematically such probabilistic data can be represented in various
ways. In some special cases it is possible to represent data by complex am-
plitudes. A complex amplitude (wave function) φ ≡ φD(O,C) is constructed
by using a formula of total probability with cos-interference term, see [6]-[10]
for extended exposition. In this way we obtain the probabilistic formalism of
quantum mechanics. In other cases it is possible to represent data by hyper-
bolic amplitudes8 and we obtain the probabilistic formalism of “hyperbolic
quantum mechanics,” [9], [10].
4. Contextualistic statistical model (Va¨xjo¨ model)
Definition 2. A contextualistic statistical model of reality is a triple
M = (C,O,D(O, C)) (2)
where C is a set of contexts and O is a set of observables which satisfy to
axioms 1,2, and D(O, C) is probabilistic data about contexts C obtained with
the aid of observables O.
We call observables belonging the set O ≡ O(M) reference of observables.
Inside of a modelM observables belonging O give the only possible references
about a context C ∈ C.
5. Realistic interpretation of reference observables
Our general model can (but, in principle, need not) be completed by some
interpretation of reference observables a ∈ O. By the Va¨xjo¨ interpretation
reference observables are interpreted as properties of contexts:
“If an observation of a under a complex of physical conditions C ∈ C gives
the result a = α, then this value is interpreted as the objective property of
the context C (at the moment of the observation).”
8Such amplitudes are constructed by using a formula of total probability with cosh-
interference term (“hyperbolic interference”), see [10].
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As always, a model is not sensitive to interpretation. Therefore, instead
of the realistic Va¨xjo¨ interpretation, we might use the Bohrian measurement-
contextualistic interpretation, see Remark 1. However, by assuming the re-
ality of contexts it would be natural to assume also the reality of observables
which are used for the statistical representation of contexts. Thus we use the
realistic interpretation both for contexts and reference observables. This is
Va¨xjo¨ realism.
6. On the role of reference observables
Reader has already paid attention that reference observables play the
special role in our model. I interpret the set O as a family of observables
which represent some fixed class of properties of contexts belonging C. For
example, such a family can be chosen by some class of cognitive systems Zcogn
– “observers” – which were interested only in the O-properties of contexts C
(and in the process of evolution they developed the ability to “feel” these and
only these properties of contexts). The latter does not mean that observables
O are not realistic. I would like just to say that observers τ ∈ Zcogn use only
observables O.
We remark again that there can exist other properties of contexts C which
are not represented by observables O. The same set of contexts C can be the
basis of various models of contextual reality: Mi = (C,Oi,D(Oi, C)), i =
1, 2, .... For example, such models can be created by various classes of cogni-
tive systems Zcogn,i.
Moreover, we may exclude the spiritual element from observables. By con-
sidering “observation” as “feeling”of a context C by some system τ we need
not presuppose that τ is a cognitive system. Such a τ can be, e.g., a physical
system (e.g. an electron) which “feel” a context C (e.g., electromagnetic-
context).
Remark 2. (Number of reference observables) In both most important
physical models – in classical and quantum models – the set O of reference
observables consists of two observables: position and momentum. I think
that this number “two” of reference observables plays the crucial role (at
least in the quantum model).
7. Va¨xjo¨ model outside physics
Our contextual statistical realistic models of reality can be used not only
in physics, but in any domain of natural and social sciences. Instead of
complexes of physical conditions, we can consider complexes of biological,
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social, economic,... conditions – contexts – as elements of reality. Such
elements of reality are represented by probabilistic data obtained with the
aid of reference observables (biological, social, economic,...).
In the same way as in physics in some special cases it is possible to encode
such data by complex amplitudes. In this way we obtain representations of
some biological, social, economic,.... models in complex Hilbert spaces. We
call them complex quantum-like models. These models describe the usual
cos-interference of probabilities.
Thus, when we speak, e.g., about a quantum-like mental model, this has
nothing to do with quantum mechanics for electrons, photons, ... contained in
the brain, see [29] for detail. A quantum-like mental model is a contextualistic
probabilistic model of brain and nothing more, []. There were found (at least
preliminary) experimental evidences that in psychology there can be obtained
quantum-like (i.e., represented by complex probability amplitudes) statistical
data, see [30]; such data also can be generated by some games, [31] (which
have been called “quantum-like games” in [31]).
8. Choice of a probability model
As was mentioned, any Va¨xjo¨ model M should be combined on some
concrete probabilistic model describing probabilistic data D(O, C). Of course,
the Kolmogorov measure-theoretical model dominates in modern physics.
However, this is not the only possible model for probability, see [21]. In
particular, I strongly support using of the frequency model [20], [21]. Here
we shall use this model to describe probabilistic data. It does not mean that
other models which are used in physics cannot be combined with some Va¨xjo¨
models. Of course, such a combination is not straightforward, see [8] on the
use of the contextual extension of the Kolmogorov model. We now present
the frequency probabilistic description of data D(O, C) for some C ∈ C.
9. Frequency description of probability distributions
By taking into account Remark 2, we consider a set of reference observ-
ables O = {a, b} consisting of two observables a and b. We denotes the sets
of values (“spectra”) of the reference observables by symbols Xa and Xb,
respectively.
Let C be some context. In a series of observations of b (which can be
infinite in a mathematical model) we obtain a sequence of values of b :
x ≡ x(b/C) = (x1, x2, ..., xN , ...), xj ∈ Xb. (3)
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In a series of observations of a we obtain a sequence of values of a :
y ≡ y(a/C) = (y1, y2, ..., yN , ...), yj ∈ Xa. (4)
We suppose that the principle of statistical stabilization for relative frequen-
cies holds true and the frequency probabilities are well defined:
pb(β) ≡ Px(b = β) = lim
N→∞
νN (β; x), β ∈ Xb; (5)
pa(α) ≡ Py(a = α) = lim
N→∞
νN (α; y), α ∈ Xa. (6)
Here νN(β; x) and νN (α; y) are frequencies of observations of values b = β
and a = α, respectively (under the complex of conditions C).
Let Cα, α ∈ Xa, be contexts corresponding to α-filtrations, see Axiom 1.
By observation of b under the context Cα we obtain a sequence:
xα ≡ x(b/Cα) = (x1, x2, ..., xN , ...), xj ∈ Xb. (7)
It is also assumed that for sequences of observations xα, α ∈ Xa, the principle
of statistical stabilization for relative frequencies holds true and the frequency
probabilities are well defined:
pb/a(β/α) ≡ Pxα(b = β) = lim
N→∞
νN(β; x
α), β ∈ Xb. (8)
Here νN (β; x
α), α ∈ Xa, are frequencies of observations of value b = β under
the complex of conditions Cα. We obtain probability distributions:
Px(β), Py(α), Pxα(β), α ∈ Xa, β ∈ Xb. (9)
We can repeat all previous considerations by changing b/a-conditioning to
a/b-conditioning. We consider contexts Cβ, β ∈ Xb, corresponding to se-
lections with respect to values of the observable b and the corresponding
collectives yβ ≡ y(a/Cβ) induced by observations of a in contexts Cβ. There
can be defined probabilities pa/b(α/β) ≡ Pyβ(α). Combining these data with
data (9) we obtain
D(O, C) = {pa(α), pb(β), pb/a(β/α), pa/b(α/β) : α ∈ Xa, β ∈ Xb}
This data gives a statistical contextual image of reality based on refer-
ence observables a and b. As was remarked, there exist various mathematical
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methods for encoding of data D(O, C), e.g., in some cases by complex am-
plitudes – complex quantum-like representations.
10. Representation in a complex Hilbert space
Let M be a contextualistic statistical model such that O contains only
two observables a and b. For any context C ∈ C, by using statistical data
D(a, b, C) we can compute a quantity λ(β/α, C), α ∈ Xa, β ∈ Xb, see [6]-[10].
This quantity was called in [6]-[10] a measure of statistical disturbance (of the
b-observable by the a-observations under the context C). If
|λ(β/α, C)| ≤ 1 (10)
for all α ∈ Xa, β ∈ Xb, then data D(O, C) can be represented (by using the
formula of total probability with interference term) by a complex amplitude
φC or in the abstract framework by an element the unit sphere U1 of the
complex Hilbert space H. Denote the family of all contexts which satisfy to
(10) by the symbol Ctr. We have the map:
J : Ctr → U1 (11)
We emphasize that J is determined by the reference observables a and b.
Thus (11) is a Hilbert space representation of contexts determined by these
concrete reference observables. The map J is not one to one. Thus by
representing contexts by complex amplitudes we lose a lot of information
about contexts.
The map (11) induces [8] a map:
L : O → L(H), (12)
where L(H) is the set of self-adjoint operators. Probability distributions of
operators aˆ = L(a) and bˆ = L(b) (calculated by using quantum Hilbert space
framework) in the state φC coincide with p
a(α) and pb(β).
If for a context C we find that
|λ(β/α, C)| ≥ 1 (13)
then C can be represented by a hyperbolic amplitude
11. Systems, ensemble representation
We now complete the contextualistic statistical model by considering sys-
tems ω (e.g., physical or cognitive, or social,..) Systems are also elements
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of realty. In our model a context C ∈ C is represented by an ensemble SC
of systems which have been interacted with C. For such systems we shall use
notation:
ω ←֓ C
The set of all (e.g., physical or cognitive, or social) systems which are used
to represent all contexts C ∈ C is denoted by the symbol Ω ≡ Ω(C). Thus we
have a map:
C → SC = {ω ∈ Ω : ω ←֓ C}. (14)
This is the ensemble representation of contexts. We set
S ≡ S(C) = {S : S = SC , C ∈ C}.
The ensemble representation of contexts is given by the map (14)
I : C → S
Reference observables O are now interpreted as observables on systems ω ∈
Ω. In principle, we can interpret values of observables as objective properties
of systems. Oppositely to the very common opinion, such models (with
realistic observables) can have nontrivial quantum-like representations (in
complex and hyperbolic Hilbert spaces) which are based on the formula of
total probability with interference terms.
Probabilities are defined as ensemble probabilities, see [21].
Definition 3. The ensemble representation of a contextualistic statistical
model M = (C,O,D(O, C)) is a triple
S(M) = (S,O,D(O, C)) (15)
where S is a set of ensembles representing contexts C, O is a set of observ-
ables, and D(O, C) is probabilistic data about ensembles S obtained with the
aid of observables O.
12. Algebraic structure on the set of reference observables
We do not assume the presence of any algebraic structure on O. Even if
these observables take values in some set endowed with an algebraic structure,
e.g., inR, we do not assume that this structure induces (in the standard way)
the corresponding algebraic structure on O. If a, b ∈ O and take values in
R it does not imply that d = a + b is well defined as observable on every
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context C ∈ C. In the general contextual approach it is very clear why we
cannot do this. If a and b are not compatible, then we cannot measure
they simultaneously under a context C at the fixed instant of time and form
d = a+ b. But a reader may say:
“You use the realistic interpretation of the reference observables in a
model M. Thus one can form the sum d = a + b.”
a). By the realistic contextualistic interpretation, a(t) and b(t) are ob-
jective properties of a context C at the instant of time t. There is defined
d(t) = a(t) + b(t).
b). By the realistic interpretation of the model with systems, a(ω) and
b(ω) are objective properties of a system ω. There is defined d(ω) = a(ω) +
b(ω).
However, this is the ontic or “hidden sum” and the representation (12)
cannot be extended to such sums. Quantum theory cannot say us anything
about d = a + b as pointwise observable. Of course, we can define the sum
of operators dˆ = aˆ + bˆ, but in general this operator would represent not the
ontic observable d, but another observable dquant. Observables d and dquant
can have different probability distributions! (see [8]). Nevertheless (and this
seems to be crucial in using of quantum theory), averages of these observables
coincide:
< dquant >≡< dˆ >=< d > (16)
This is a consequence of linearity of both quantum (Hilbert space) and clas-
sical probabilistic averages and the coincidence of probability distributions
of reference observables and they representatives in the Hilbert space.
13. Realist and empirisist interpretations of quantum mechanics
We emphasize again that up to now we have not been considering an
interpretation of quantum mechanics. There was proposed a contextualistic
statistical model of physical reality. Sometimes this model can be mathe-
matically described by using the formalism of classical mechanics, sometimes
quantum, sometimes hyperbolic and so on. However, it is useful to discuss
relation of our model to models of physical reality corresponding to vari-
ous interpretations of quantum mechanics. Here we follow to P. Busch, M.
Grabowski, P. J. Lahti [15], de Muynck, De Baere, and Martens [32] and L.
Ballentine [33].
13.1. Empirisist interpretation. In this interpretation the formalism
of quantum mechanics does not describe reality as such. It only serves to
calculate probabilities (relative frequencies) of certain phenomena that can
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be interpreted as corresponding to the results of a quantum measurement.
The probabilities are conditioned on certain procedures, to be interpreted
as quantum mechanical preparation procedures. Thus, the wave function or
density operator can be interpreted as symbolizing a preparation procedure;
in the same way a hermitian operator describes symbolically a quantum
mechanical measurement. Wave function and hermitian operator are not
thought to correspond to something existing in microscopic reality. They
are just labels of (macroscopic) instruments that can be found in the labora-
tory. QM is thought to describe only (cor)relations of preparation acts and
measurement phenomena, It is also important for our further considerations
to underline that in an empirisist interpretation of QM the eigenvalues of
the hermitian operator do not play a significant role, because these eigenval-
ues do not correspond to properties of the microscopic object. The empirisist
interpretation has achieved great popularity because its antimetaphysical fla-
vor: physics must be about observables only, and about nothing else. Hence,
in this interpretation neither the wave function nor the observable must be
taken as a property of the microscopic object system.
13.2. Realist interpretation. By this interpretation values of physical
observables are considered as objective properties – properties of objects
(physical systems).
13.3. Va¨xjo¨ interpretation: realism of contexts. In the Va¨xjo¨
approach quantum mechanics (as a physical theory) is a particular contex-
tualistic statistical model of reality in which the probabilistic data D(O, C)
can be encoded by complex amplitudes. This point of view to quantum for-
malism induces the Va¨xjo¨ interpretation of quantum mechanics. This is a
contextualistic statistical realistic interpretation of quantum mechanics. And
Va¨xjo¨ realism is realism of contexts and reference observables.
The Va¨xjo¨ interpretation of quantum mechanics is quite close to the em-
pirisist interpretation. The crucial difference is that by the Va¨xjo¨ interpreta-
tion quantum mechanics is about reality – reality of contexts, and not about
preparation and measurement procedures. Contexts exist independently of
our measurement activity and values of reference observables a ∈ O are
objective properties of contexts. The space-scale does not play any role, be-
cause the description of reality is purely probabilistic. Quantum probabilistic
behaviour is a consequence of complementarity of information for reference
observables. Such complementarity of information can take place at micro-
scopic as well as macroscopic scales and, moreover, not only in physics, but
in any domain of natural and social sciences.
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We remark that by considering context as an element of reality we elimi-
nated the important difference between realist and empirisist interpretations
– the wave function is considered as a description of the result of preparation
rather than as a symbolic representation of the preparation itself. If a model
M has a quantum(-like) complex representation then the wave function rep-
resents context – a complex of physical (or biological,...) conditions.
13.4. Va¨xjo¨ interpretation: realism of contexts, systems and
observables. Let us now consider the completed Va¨xjo¨ model which con-
tains physical systems, contexts are represented by ensembles of systems.
Physical observables are considered as objective properties of systems. As
well as for general contextualistic model, quantum mechanics (as a physical
theory) is about a rather special class of contexts Ctr such the probabilistic
data D(O, Ctr) can be encoded by complex amplitudes. The only difference is
that probabilities are defined as ensemble probabilities. This interpretation
of quantum mechanics is very close to the well known ensemble interpretation
which was strongly supported by A. Einstein, see introduction; L. Ballentine
called it the statistical interpretation, see [33]. A difference is that in our
model we start with reality of contexts which can be (but need not be) rep-
resented by ensembles.
But this is not the main difference. The main difference is that we did
not start at all with an interpretation of one special mathematical formalism,
calculus of probabilities in complex Hilbert spaces. We started with a gen-
eral contextual statistical model of reality and then demonstrated that some
special contexts can be represented by quantum-like complex amplitudes.
Interpretation of such amplitudes follows automatically from the basic con-
textual statistical model.
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